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NOTES AND COMMENTS
interpretation of the statutes, it would appear impossible for a citizen
to go to the clerk of the superior court and obtain a permit to purchase
a target pistol of .22 caliber.
It is suggested that the laws concerning firearms in North Carolina
should be re-examined and clarified, with an underlying policy designed
to resolve the conflict between the need for regulation and the prohibi-
tion of infringement of the right to keep and bear arms.
JOHN D. ELLER, JR.
Military Jurisdiction-Ex-Servicemen-Civilian Dependents
The United States Supreme Court in the greatly controverted
Quarles v. Toth case1 declared that ex-servicemen are not subject to
military jurisdiction for crimes committed in the service where charges
are not preferred prior to discharge.
In stating that Article 3(a) 2 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,3 which provided for such jurisdiction was unconstitutional,
the Court held that Congress had no power to give military courts such
jurisdiction either under its powers "To raise and support Armies,' 4
"To declare War,"5 "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the militia," or "To punish... (offenses) ... against the Law of
Nations" ;7 nor could such power be derived from the President's power
as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
The Court further expressed its belief that "any expansion of court-
martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts set up under Article III of the
Constitution .... '"8 (Emphasis added.)
Possibly the most dominant reason which led to the Toth decision
was the effect of Article 3(a) on the constitutional safeguard of trial
by jury. This appraisal is certainly apparent from justice Black's state-
ment, "We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of
military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III
courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people [i.e., civilians]
I United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955). This case has
been the subject of many comments; see: 67 HAMv. L. R.wv. 479 (1954) ; 21 U.
CHI. L. REv. 426 (1954); 41 CORNELL L. Q. 498 (1956); 33 TEx. L. REV. 932
(1955).
2 "Subject to the provisions of Article 43, any person charged with having
committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this Code, an offense
against this Code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status."
64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 553(a) (1952).
'Hereinafter: U. C. M. J. U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
'U. S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 11. 'U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
' U. S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. '350 U. S. 11, 15.
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charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, lib-
erty, or property."9  The Court seemed extremely hesitant to deprive
veterans of the protection afforded by jury trial and rejected the con-
tention that power to circumvent such protection could be inferred
through the "Necessary and Proper" clause.
Although the Toth Case apparently decided the question of military
jurisdiction over ex-servicemen, 10 it left unanswered the question of
whether the Toth decision would be extended to include other civilians
who had theretofore been subject to various other sections"' of the
U. C. M. J., i.e., civilian dependents and civilians working for and with
the armed forces overseas. The possibility of such an extention was ap-
parent from the Court's comment, "For given its natural meaning the
power granted Congress ... would seem to restrict court-marital juris-
diction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed
forces." (Emphasis added.)12
At the end of the 1956 Spring Term, the Supreme Court in Kinsella
v. Krueger'3 and Reid v. Covert'4 indicated that it was unwilling to
extend the Toth philosophy any further than was necessary. Both cases
involved dependent wives alleged to have murdered their husbands who
were on active duty outside the continental limits of the United States.
Trials by general court-martial were awarded each defendant, verdicts
of guilty were found, and sentences imposed. Habeas corpus proceed-
ings were instituted, and the two cases were reviewed before the
Supreme Court which upheld the convictions,1 declaring that Article
2(11):16 of the U. C. M. J. was constitutional.
Justice ClarklT who wrote the majority opinions in these two sub-
sequent cases, initially stated that Congress had the power to establish
legislative courts'8 and that citizens of the United States are not
Old. at 17.
"0 Prior to Quarles v. Toth there were conflicting views; see: United States
ex tel Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) and
Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F. 2d 128 (9th Gr. 1950).
" U. C. M. J. art. 2, §§ 5, 7, 8, 10, 12. "350 U. S. 11, 15.
"351 U. S. 470 (1956). 1"351 U. S. 487 (1956).
11 Military courts are legislative courts; neither their finding or decisions are
reviewable by any civil court, including the Supreme Court, except collaterally by
means of habeas corpus proceedings. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1954);
Collins v. McDonold, 258 U. S. 416 (1923); Torble's Case, 13 Wall. 397 (1871).
"0 Article 2 provides: "The following persons are subject to this code.... (11)
Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States
is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the con-
tinental limits of the United States and without the following territories; That
part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the
Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands." 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 551 (1952).
17 yustice Clark was one of two justices who joined in all three majority
opinions of the principal cases.18351 U. S. 470, 475-476.
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guaranteed the right of trial by jury outside the continental limits of
the United States, District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii. 19
Upon these foregoing premises the Court concluded, "If it is
reasonable and consonant with due process for Congress to employ
the existing system of courts-martial for this purpose, the enactment
[Article 2(11)] must be sustained." 20
Attention should be focused on the fact that Articles 3 (a) and 2 (11)
of the U. C. M. J. are necessarily based upon the same constitutional
provisions, yet the Court labeled the former unconstitutional in the Toth
Case and the latter constitutional in the two more recent cases. Possibly
the sole explanation for the above can be found obscurely embedded
within footnote six2l of the Kinsella v. Krueger opinion, where the
Court narrowly construed the Toth ruling to a concise minimum: that
Article 3(a) was unconstitutional because it "necessarily encroached on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts set up under Article III of the
Constitution."
Having established this restriction, the Court went on to say that
there could be no such encroachment in the Krueger Case. However,
the Court did not specifically say exactly why there could be no encroach-
ment. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that the distinction was based
upon the fact that Congress had not acted in giving the federal courts
jurisdiction over the person or the crime. By so distinguishing the
Toth Case the Court stated that it would not be necessary to justify
the power of Congress with its [Congress's] constitutional limitations.
This latter statement of the Court raises two more questions which
have not as yet been answered by the Court. Was there actually an
encroachment in the Toth Case where the federal courts had in fact been
given no jurisdiction over such crimes by Congress ?22 And secondly,
if not: Was this encroachment the only justification for declaring
Article 3(a) unconstitutional?
There seems to be two plausible alternatives which arise from the
above analysis. Either the foundations of the Toth Case have been re-
moved by the Court, leaving a mere legal mirage to support the final con-
clusion that ex-servicemen are free from military jurisdiction, or the
Supreme Court has indirectly decided that it is not necessary for
Congress to actually give the federal courts jurisdiction over crimes
committed by ex-servicemen while they were in the service before
"o There is considerable authority to support this premise; see: In re Ross,
140 U. S. 453 (1891); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S, 145 (1879); In re
Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944) ; United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp.
708 (1944).
20 351 U. S. 470, 476.
21 Ibid.
22 This" query was raised in Justice Reed's dissent, U. S. ex rel Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11, 24-28 (1955) (dissent).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a grant of such authority to a military court, in lieu thereof, will be
termed an encroachment on the federal court's jurisdiction.23
The present status of the law seems to be that ex-servicemen canuot
be tried by the military or civil courts for crimes committed while on
active duty overseas, unless charges are brought prior to discharge.24
In respect to civilian dependents and civilians working for and with the
armed forces, the military courts continue to exercise jurisdiction. It
also seems reasonable that the Supreme Court will extend the Toth
ruling to exempt civilians subject to the U. C. M. J., who return to the
United States before charges are preferred by the military authorities
for crimes committed overseas. 25
J. N. GoLDING
Taxation-Federal Income-Nonrestricted Stock Options-Proprie-
tary and Compensatory Options-Taxability of Options upon Receipt'
In a recent Supreme Court decision, a serious blow was dealt tax-
payers seeking to avoid income taxation arising out of certain employer-
employee stock option plans. In Commissioner v. LoBue2 the Court
decided against a distinction supported in the Tax Court s and Courts of
Appeals4 which, for income tax purposes, divided employee stock option
plans into two types.
The basic problem involved may be illustrated simply. TP, a key
employee of X Corporation, is given an option by the corporation to
21 It is likely that Congress will now give the federal courts jurisdiction over
ex-servicemen and ex-dependents; such would be constitutional. U. S. CONST.
art. III, § 2; Skiriotes v. Fldrida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; United States v. Bowman,
260 U. S. 94 (1923) ; Jones i. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
2 Military jurisdiction is not retroactive in regard to crimes committed prior
to induction, although servicemen are presently on active duty; United States
v. Logan, C. M. 248867, 31 B. R. 363 (1944) ; nor can it be revived as to crimes
committed during the first enlistment, even though a second enlistment immedi-
ately follows; United States ex rel Herschberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
However, military jurisdiction does not cease while a discharged serviceman is
serving his sentence; Kohn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1921) ; and if charges are
brought before discharge, military jurisdiction continues after said discharge;
Carter v. McCloughry, 183 U. S. 365 (1902).
2u 351 U. S. 487, 490.
'In 1950 Congress enacted what is now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 421, which
provides for capital gains treatment of certain "restricted stock options." If an
option complies with § 421 the employee has to report no income until he sells the
stock; and, then, any excess over the option price is taxed as a capital gain.
However, any stock option plan which does not come within the restrictions of
§ 421 will not receive the special capital gains treatment. The taxability of these
so-called nqnrestricted options is the subject of this note.
2 351 U. S. 243 (1956).
' Malcolm S. Clark, P-H 1950 T. C. Mem. Dec. f1 50210; Norman G. Nichol-
son, 13 T. C. 690 (1949) ; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 258 (1938).
'Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955), re'd, 351 U. S. 243
(1956) ; Commissioner v. Smith, 142 F. 2d 818 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U. S. 177
(1945).
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